Every society constructs
its own civic rituals. Some are born to
remember, others to reassure. The Day of
Remembrance runs this risk every year:
turning an event that should unsettle
the conscience into a liturgy that
soothes it.
To remember, however, does not mean to
celebrate.
It means
to think against oneself.
The Shoah is not merely a historical
fact to be placed between 1933 and 1945,
nor a closed chapter of European
history. It is a limit-event that
continues to question our way of
conceiving civilisation, rationality,
progress. Not for what it was, but for
what made it possible.
Reducing Auschwitz to an eruption of
barbarism amounts to reassuring
ourselves: the barbarian is always other
than us. But what makes the Shoah a
permanent trauma of European culture is
precisely the opposite. It takes shape
within a literate, juridically
structured, technologically advanced
civilisation; a civilisation that chose
deliberately to place its
finest instruments — law, bureaucracy,
organisation, science — at the service
of annihilation.
Auschwitz-Birkenau is not
the symbol of chaos, but of order. Not
of irrationality, but of a rationality
that has renounced questioning its own
ends.
This is the point that continues to
disturb, and it is for this reason that
it is so often removed. Because it
forces us to recognise that civilisation
is not a moral guarantee. It can
function even without conscience. It can
operate with precision even when it has
lost any sense of limit.
Extermination does not begin with the
gas chambers. It begins when the human
being is translated into administrative
language. When the individual becomes a
category, the face becomes a datum, life
becomes a “case”. It begins when
language ceases to name persons and
starts to manage problems.
Before physical violence, there is
semantic violence.
It is here that the Shoah questions the
present. Not because historical forms
repeat themselves identically, but
because
mental mechanisms are reproducible.
Every system that separates efficiency
from responsibility, every apparatus
that rewards obedience at the expense of
judgement, every language that
neutralises the other by reducing them
to a function, reactivates — on another
scale, in another form — the same
device.
Hannah
Arendt spoke of the
“banality of evil” not in order to
absolve, but to aggravate guilt: the
most dangerous evil is not the one that
recognises itself as such, but the one
exercised without any longer asking
questions, within procedures considered
normal.
For this reason memory is not a
sentimental exercise. It is a critical
exercise. It does not serve to confirm
that we are on the right side of
history, but to ask
under what conditions it becomes
possible to stop being so.
Every epoch elaborates its own
vocabulary of exclusion. Words change;
the function does not. Memory serves to
recognise those signals before they
become system: when complexity is
derided, when empathy is treated as
weakness, when simplification becomes a
civic virtue.
If memory becomes merely a ritual, it
ceases to function.
It becomes a form of collective
self-absolution.
To remember, instead, should mean
accepting a permanent unease: the
awareness that no civilisation is
immune, that no progress is
irreversible, that no rationality is
innocent unless it is accompanied by
responsibility.
Memory does not serve to close the past.
It serves to prevent the present from
ceasing to think